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Abstract. In this work we address the challenge for an IT service customer to
select the cost-optimal service among different offers by external providers. We
describe the customer’s optimization problem by considering the negative monetary impact of potential service incidents on its business. First, we demonstrate
that the information currently used in service level agreements may lead to
suboptimal customer decisions. Second, we discuss how providers’ private information about the behavior of service delivery environments could be leveraged by the customer when selecting service offers. Third, we propose a procurement auction as a mechanism to optimize total cost for the customer –
choosing from different service offers by risk-neutral providers. In introducing
this approach, we suggest that customers and providers collaborate to define
service performance measures, which allow providers to better tailor service offers to customers’ business requirements.
Keywords: Service Level Management, Service Level Agreement, Adverse
Business Impact, Service Incident, Procurement Auction

1

Introduction

Outsourcing of IT services is popular and growing. The worldwide revenue generated
with outsourcing totaled $246.6 bn in 2011 – an increase of 7.8 percent compared to
2010 [1]. But in spite of the increasing significance of outsourced IT services, there
are still opportunities for improvement (see, e.g., [2-3]).
In this work we address the business and IT alignment challenge (see, e.g., [4]) for
an IT service customer to select the cost-optimal service among different offers by
external providers. We describe the customer’s optimization problem by considering
the negative monetary impact of potential service incidents on its business.
Typically, the provision of outsourced services is governed by a service level
agreement (SLA) – also including performance requirements for the vendor, such as
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throughput, response time, and service outages. We focus on service outages of endto-end services, which directly affect the customer’s business performance; however,
our findings can in many cases be generalized to also cover other performance dimensions.
In practice, performance requirements for system outages are typically expressed
by two specifications: the minimum availability of the service over a given period of
time and the maximum duration of any single service outage incident (see, e.g., [5]).
For example, the minimum availability might be expressed as 99% uptime every
month and the maximum incident duration might be specified as 30 minutes. Let us
call this requirements specification method the (min, max) regime, where the target
values for min and max are called service level objectives (SLOs).
We address two primary research questions in this paper: First, we analyze why the
(min, max) method of performance specification of service outages leaves purchasers
under-informed and why, as a consequence (under reasonable assumptions), decisions
based on this method may be significantly suboptimal. We discuss how providers’
private information about the behavior of service delivery environments could be
leveraged by the customer when selecting service offers. Second, we examine how
the customer could optimize its total cost in choosing from different service offers by
risk-neutral providers. We propose a procurement auction as a mechanism to support
customers in determining the cost-optimal solution to their optimization problem
considering the negative monetary impact of potential service incidents on their
business.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews related
literature. We introduce the base scenario, which we address later on, in Section 3. In
Section 4, we analyze the monetarily quantified negative impact of selected incident
duration distributions on the performance of a customer business process. We discuss
how a provider could support the customer in solving its decision problem in Section
5. In Section 6, we propose a service procurement auction approach that enables the
customer to select its cost-optimal service solution. Finally, Section 7 summarizes and
discusses our approach, and outlines the next steps towards application of these ideas
in industry.

2

Related Work

We conducted a literature review following the methodology proposed by Webster
and Watson [6]. In an extensive forward and backward search without temporal restriction, Google Scholar and CiteSeer served as our main sources of search. Keywords used were ‘service level objective’, ‘service level agreement’, ‘service level
management’, ‘optimal choice’, ‘business impact’, ‘incident management’, ‘decision
theory’ and ‘customer’ as well as combinations thereof.
Focusing on the research field of IT (outsourcing) we found six papers – by Jin et
al. [7], Sauvé et al. [8], Cheng et al. [9], Taylor and Tofts [10], Barroero et al. [11]
and Franke [12] – which are related to our approach that aims to support the consideration of adverse business impact in service offers. None of these works, however,

1016

closely matches our scenario and approach. Our own prior work contains discussions
of these papers and is more directly relevant:
In [13] we discuss the customer’s optimization problem to select the cost-optimal
SLA having concluded a long-term outsourcing contract with a single external provider. We propose a methodology to solve the optimization problem in a scenario
without penalties. In [14] we extend that approach and discuss the customer’s optimization problem in a setting where a provider has to compensate the customer for every
single service incident to occur. We propose a single-attribute procurement auction
approach to identify and select the cost-optimal service offer out of different providers’ bids. In contrast to this work, our prior work does not consider the cases of providers bidding tuples of target values for service level indicators (i.e., performance
measures) and a price (multi-attribute procurement auction) or of receiving incentive
bonus payments for ‘better-than-promised’ performance. In [15] we propose a simulation-based procedure to monetarily quantify the negative impact of single service
incidents on the customer business.
Furthermore, there are several areas of research complementary to our work: Taking a more technical perspective, Wittgreffe et al. [16] provide concepts aiming at the
design of end-to-end SLAs that are directly targeted at business applications of the
service customer. Breitgand et al. [17] present an SLA design approach which enables
service providers to derive optimal response time SLOs for a service by analyzing
historical performance data of the applied IT infrastructure. Blau et al. [18] use a multidimensional procurement auction to determine the socially efficient service composition in a service value network aiming at the maximization of welfare.
Summing up, none of the related works closely matches our scenario and approach,
namely: (i) We monetarily measure the negative business impact of service offers by
(ii) quantifying the incurred business cost resulting from the occurrence of combinations of service incidents and (iii) explicitly considering business cost functions which
do not develop linearly with service performance attributes. We do this in a setting in
which providers have private information they do not want to disclose (iv).

3

Base Scenario

In our base scenario, which we address later on, a customer company wants to purchase an end-to-end IT service from an external service provider to support a particular business process. This non-mission-critical, yet non-commodity service directly
affects the customer’s business performance, i.e., it contributes measurably to the
business value created. Competing providers are able to offer the particular service
with different SLAs, i.e., at different service levels and different prices.
We assume that all functional and non-functional properties (including base sizing)
of the service, except for performance and price, have already been documented in a
‘Request for Proposal’ (RfP). For this purpose, requirements of the business process
to be supported have been considered. The RfP also states a fixed delivery duration,
which may be split into a number of reference periods.
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To define service performance the customer has specified a set of service level indicators (performance measures), and associated service level objectives (target values). An SLA is represented by a tuple of service level objectives and a service price,
which the customer will have to pay to the selected provider on a periodic basis for
service provisioning. In the RfP, the customer has also defined penalty functions for
each service level indicator. These specify the amount of money a provider will have
to pay in case of service level breaches. Further, the RfP grants the customer the right
of constant access to the monitoring information that the provider collects.
To compare service providers’ offers, we assume the customer will estimate and
monetarily quantify the negative impact of imperfect service (at specific service levels) on its business process. Also, the customer is assumed to consider its expectations
of providers to achieve, to under- or even outperform the stated SLOs (cf. [13]). Using these ‘business cost’ estimates, the service price, as well as the expected penalty
payments, the customer can assess the financial implications resulting from the selection of a specific SLA, i.e., it can determine total customer cost. We suppose that the
rational customer in our setting aims to identify the cost-optimal service offer.
Since customer and provider have agreed on a fixed delivery duration, capital
budgeting approaches, such as the net present value method, can be applied to discount cash flows (i.e., total customer cost) of several future reference periods. This
allows the comparison of SLAs which state service prices and business cost changing
over time, i.e., varying in different reference periods. For reasons of clarity, however,
we will focus on a single reference period.

4

The Adverse Business Impact of Service Incidents

The (min, max) performance measures normally found in SLAs for specifying requirements for service outages may be called aggregating and limiting service level
indicators. An example: A logistics company C runs a high-bay warehouse with a
management system that is operated and managed by the provider P as a service.
This end-to-end service is defined to be available 99% of the time of a reference period [this is the SLO of the aggregating service level indicator min], whereas no single
service incident may last longer than 30 minutes [this is the SLO of the limiting service level indicator max].
The information lost in the aggregation may, however, have undesirable consequences for making decisions – as will be illustrated in the following. Using these
established service level indicators the customer has no information about the specific
probabilities of a service to achieve, to under- or even outperform the stipulated
SLOs. Consequently, the customer is not able to determine with any precision the
business cost resulting from the selection of an SLA. Even if the service level objective combinations of aggregating and limiting service level indicators are exactly met,
customers may not be able to determine the adverse business impact. Let us see why.
Adverse business impact, resulting in business cost, is caused by each service incident (SI), i.e., by each ‘unplanned interruption’ to a service or ‘reduction in the quality’ of a service, which is observable from a business point of view (adapted from the
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definition of ‘incident’ in [19]). We use business cost functions to describe the business cost induced by a single service incident of a certain type with regard to its incident attribute values. These business cost functions may develop non-proportionally
to service incidents’ attribute values, i.e., they do not need to increase or decrease
linearly.
Example (cont’d): The warehouse management system is used to locate goods in
the high-bay warehouse that have to be taken out of stock and shipped by truck. Every
five minutes, one truck arrives at the warehouse in order to be loaded. Outages of the
warehouse management system (i.e., service incidents of the type ‘outage incidents’,
which are described by the single attribute ‘outage duration’) interrupt this workflow.
For each minute a truck has to wait to be loaded, C incurs business cost of € 1. Figure 1 shows how C’s aggregated business cost increases with longer outage durations.

Fig. 1. Business cost of a single outage incident w.r.t. outage duration

The blue triangles in Figure 1 represent the (discrete) business cost values of single
outage incidents with respect to their duration.1 The red diamonds in Figure 1 describe the average business cost per minute an outage incident causes with respect to
its duration.2 For instance, an outage incident that lasts 25 minutes induces business
cost of € 75, i.e., average business cost of € 3 per minute of outage.
When an aggregating service level indicator is used, the achieved service quality is
calculated considering the values of a specific attribute of all service incidents of the
same type (service incident class) that occur within a certain reference period. In order to quantify business cost in case of moderately non-linear business cost functions3, however, it is essential for the customer to understand which combination of
incident attribute values actually realizes a specific achieved value (of an aggregating
1

The discrete business cost values (blue triangles) can be approximated by the continuous
business cost function y=0.0999x²+0.3028x.
2
The average business cost per minute values (red diamonds) can be approximated by the
continuous function y=0.0975x+0.4786.
3
We obtained our results below assuming a moderately non-linear business cost function. Due
to space limitations we cannot report a full sensitivity analysis. The business cost function
we employ, however, is realistic and reasonably robust.
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service level indicator). The distribution of single incidents’ attribute values, e.g., of
their outage durations, has to be considered.
To illustrate the potential consequences of different incident attribute value distributions on business cost, we continue our example:
We assume the provider to exactly achieve the target availability of 99% (i.e., 432
minutes of total outage time within a month) and to avoid single service incidents
lasting longer than 30 minutes.
Let OT be the total outage time permitted and xmax be the maximum length of a single outage incident. Furthermore, let xi be the length of outage i during the reference
period T and let b(xi) = 0.0999xi² + 0.3028xi be the non-linear business cost function.
Now assume xi ≤ xmax, 褐i , and, xi = xj, 褐i,j.
If all outages occurring in T have the same duration xfix, this leads to significantly
different total business cost for different values of xfix (see Table 1):
Table 1. Different outage durations lead to significantly different business cost
xfix

b(xfix)

10
20
30

€ 13.02
€ 46.02
€ 98.99

number of incidents
within T (rounded)
43
21
14

total business cost
caused within T
€ 559.77
€ 996.34
€ 1,385.92

Having shown the impact of different outage durations using this simple calculation
we can now discuss a more complex setting: Figure 2 shows the relative frequencies
of different outage incident durations for selected beta-distributions4.

Fig. 2. Relative frequencies of beta-distributed outage incident durations on the interval (0;30]
4

We chose the beta-distribution because it can be specified within definite limits, it is very
flexible and is analytically tractable. The beta-distribution allows to model a large variety of
incident behaviors of service delivery environments, e.g., that of an environment which is
characterized by many short outages, some outages of medium length and few long outages.
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Since no single service incident may last longer than 30 minutes (SLO of the limiting
service level indicator) the distributions are limited to the interval (0;30]. By assuming the provider exactly meets the SLOs promised, we are able to calculate the business cost a customer has to expect if these targets are realized through different betadistributions of single outage durations.
We compute the following integral (see equation 1) for the given beta-distributions,
where fBeta(x, , , 0, 30) is the probability density function of a beta-distribution
which is limited to the interval (0;30] and gAvgBC/Min(x) describes the average business
cost per minute (depicted as red diamonds in Figure 1):
(1)
The probability density function is multiplied with the total outage duration, i.e., 432
minutes, in order to obtain the time which is spent on a certain incident attribute value. Figure 3 shows the resulting business cost values.
In case of non-constant marginal business cost functions, the customer has to consider the distribution of incident attribute values (a target value of an aggregating
service level indicator is realized through), since different distributions will usually
lead to different business cost.

Fig. 3. Expected business cost given different beta-distributions for single outage durations

Even if the customer in our example knew that incident durations are beta-distributed
and assumed a specific beta-distribution in order to estimate its expected business
cost, this could lead to a significant misjudgment in case the customer selects inaccurate beta-distribution parameter values.
Table 2 shows the errors with regard to expected business cost (in percent) resulting from the assumption of a specific beta-distribution, while the actual outage duration distribution follows a different beta-distribution.
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Actual
betadistribution

Table 2. Error with regard to expected business cost in percent if a ‘wrong’ beta-distribution is
assumed

B(5;30)
B(5;15)
B(5;5)
B(15;5)
B(30;5)

B(5;30)
0.0 %
-25.9 %
-53.8 %
-66.5 %
-70.0 %

Assumed beta-distribution
B(5;15)
B(5;5)
B(15;5)
35.0 %
116.5 %
198.1 %
0.0 %
60.4 %
120.9 %
-37.7 %
0.0 %
37.7 %
-54.7 %
-27.4 %
0.0 %
-59.5 %
-35.0 %
-10.5 %

B(30;5)
233.1 %
146.7 %
53.8 %
11.7 %
0.0 %

Consequently, the definition of SLOs for aggregating and limiting service level indicators is not sufficient to compare different service offers regarding the total business
cost (and, thus, total customer cost) induced in the case of non-linear business cost
functions.5 Performance measures have to consider the monetarily quantified negative
business impact of service incidents instead of incident attribute values only.
Furthermore, the example shows that it would be negligent from a customer point
of view not to reflect distributions of incident attribute values in service level agreements in case of moderately non-linear business cost functions. This idea, however,
hinges on the providers’ ability to ascertain incident attribute value distributions at
reasonable (additional) cost and, thus, price increases.

5

Service Incident Patterns

Providers usually possess private information about the service delivery environments
(SDEs), i.e., combinations of organizational and technical service components they
use to provide a service. Since outsourcing providers have many customers who purchase similar services, they are able to collect data about the frequency of service
incidents that occur when using a particular type of SDE, i.e., to establish service
incident histories for each SDE. By analyzing these data, providers can predict the
frequency distributions of service incidents of a specific type having certain incident
attribute values, i.e., determine the SDEs’ characteristic ‘service incident patterns’. If
the customer had the deep insight a provider has, it could use this information to better address its optimization problem. In the following we will denote a tuple of attribute values of a single service incident as its service incident level (SIL), with the incident type determining the tuple structure.
Considering one service incident type6 only, Table 3 illustrates a provider’s private
knowledge of an exemplary service delivery environment e. It lists in schematic form
5

6

… even if we assume the service level objective combinations of aggregating and limiting
service level indicators to be met. In practice, the stipulated SLOs might be even outperformed to certain degrees in different reference periods.
Service incidents sharing the same set of (one or more) attributes are regarded to be of the
same service incident type (e.g. outage incidents, reduced throughput incidents, etc.). Incidents of the same service incident type affect the performance of a customer business process in a similar manner, but may differ in their attribute values (e.g., in the duration of outage (outage incident) or the degree of throughput reduction (reduced throughput incident)).
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the data records about the combinations of sequential service incidents (CoSIs) the
provider has collected about this type of service delivery environment when using it
(i) during past reference periods (ii) for one or several other customers. The function
ft(SILa, b, …, n) describes the absolute frequency with which service incidents at the
levels SILa, b, …, n occurred during a specific reference period, whereas the index t labels a data record. We denote this table as CoSI/SIL frequency history.
To continue with our example: A row CoSI2 in the CoSI/SIL frequency history
could, for instance, document that there were five outage incidents with a duration in
the interval (0;5) minutes (f2((0;5))=5), three incidents with a duration in the interval
[5;10) minutes (f2([5;10))=3), … in the data record ‘2’. 7
Based on the information contained in the CoSI/SIL frequency histories, the provider determines the SDEs’ characteristic incident patterns (one pattern for each service incident type), which state the expected (absolute) frequencies of service incidents at the different service incident levels to occur within a reference period.8
Table 3. A provider’s private knowledge of the incident characteristics of a specific service
delivery environment e (CoSI/SIL frequency history)
Absolute frequencies of SIs at a certain SIL (historical data)

Service
Delivery
Environment
e

SIL1,1, …,1

…

SIL1,1, …,n

…

SILa,b,…,n

CoSI1

f1(SIL1,1, …,1)

…

f1(SIL1,1, …,n)

…

f1(SILa,b, …,n)

CoSI2

f2(SIL1,1, …,1)

…

f2(SIL1,1, …,n)

…

f2(SILa,b, …,n)

…

…

…

…

…

…

CoSIt

ft(SIL1,1, …,1)

…

ft(SIL1,1, …,n)

…

ft(SILa,b, …,n)

Providers have only little understanding of the business cost the customer incurs when
a certain CoSI is realized. In our work we assume that the customer is able to describe
business cost functions, which define the business cost caused by single service incidents with respect to their specific service incident levels (SILs). That is, the customer
can state (discrete) BusinessCost/SIL vectors for each service incident type.
Example (cont’d): A customer’s BusinessCost/SIL vector for the service incident
type ‘outage’ states that outages with a duration in the interval (0;5) minutes induce
business cost of € 1.81, outages with a duration in the interval [5;10) minutes induce
business cost of € 8.82, …
Furthermore, in the following, we assume the customer discloses this information
to selected providers, treating them as ‘trusted suppliers’. Knowing the customer’s
BusinessCost/SIL vectors (one vector for each service incident type), providers can
combine the information contained therein with their private knowledge of service
delivery environments’ service incident patterns. In doing so, they are able to calcu-

7

The classification of attribute values into attribute intervals reduces the number of service
incident levels to be considered and, thus, improves the applicability of our approach.
8
In future works, we will focus on the determination of service incident patterns from CoSI/SIL
frequency histories.
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late (provider-internal) indicators describing their service delivery environments’
impact on the customer business process in terms of business cost.
In order to determine the monetary adverse business impact – for a single service
incident type and a certain service delivery environment – a provider multiplies the
characteristic service incident pattern p with the BusinessCost/SIL vector b. Equation 2 formally describes this operation.
(2)
The resulting value r represents the business cost value the customer would incur in a
specific reference period for a specific type of incident. Assuming historical data to
allow the prediction of service incident patterns to occur in future reference periods
and service incident patterns to be stable – i.e., to have low variances with regard to
frequencies of service incidents at certain SILs to occur – providers can arrive at accurate business cost estimates. These measures reflect the adverse business impact a
customer incurs in case of constant and non-constant marginal business cost functions. Using this private information, providers can better understand the impact of
their services on customers’ business and, thus, define their service offers
accordingly.

6

A Multi-Attribute Procurement Auction to Select
Cost-optimal Service Offers

Based on the constructs introduced in the previous sections, we develop a procedure
enabling a customer to solve its optimization problem – given different service offers
by risk-neutral providers.
Today, a typical contract negotiation in IT outsourcing follows a structured approach [20]. First, by sending potential service providers a request for information,
the customer identifies suppliers that offer the service in question. Afterwards, the
customer defines a request for proposal specifying additional information about technical, economic and legal characteristics (sizing, mission-criticality, service partnership models, etc.) and further reduces the number of potential partners before the
actual negotiation process begins.
Our proposal is to use a service procurement auction to conduct the negotiation.
Auctions constitute a way to elicit bidders’ private information [21]. In our scenario
we use an auction to allow the customer to draw conclusions regarding the providers’
reservation prices for delivering their services at characteristic service incident patterns. Thus, we enable the customer to better compare different service offers. In procurement auctions providers ‘compete for the right to sell’ their services [21].
For reasons of clarity, the method presented focuses on a single reference period
only. As discussed in Section 3, capital budgeting approaches could be applied to
compare multi-reference period service contracts, which state service prices and business cost changing over time.
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6.1

Definition of the Procurement Auction

The objective of our approach is to compare service offers in order to identify and
select the one that is minimizing the total customer cost. Therefore, we define an ‘optimal mechanism’ [21] for the procurement of the service.
In the following, we assume the customer reveals its business cost functions to the
selected providers participating in the procurement auction. Providers taking part in
the procurement auction have to bid a tuple of service incident patterns (one pattern
for each service incident type with regard to service incident levels predefined by the
customer) and service price.
A provider in our example, for instance, would bid a tuple consisting of an
‘outage incident pattern’ p (stating the absolute frequencies for outage incidents at
the different service incident levels to occur) and the service price it demands with
regard to this pattern.
We define the following two rules in order to make sure that providers have no incentive to state service incident patterns of SDEs untruthfully in their bids:
If the amount of service incidents at a specific service incident level exceeds the
number stated in the service incident pattern (i.e., a provider’s bid) we define that the
future contractual partner will have to compensate the customer for every additional
service incident to occur in the amount of business cost defined in the corresponding
customer business cost function. Due to this ‘1:1’-penalty rate, providers would directly add the additional business cost to be expected (for all types of service incidents) to their service prices.
On the other hand, we define that the future contractual partner (provider) will be
rewarded for every single incident at a specific SIL it avoids (with regard to the number specified in the service incident pattern) in the amount of business cost defined in
the corresponding customer business cost function. Due to this ‘1:1’-bonus rate, providers in a competitive situation would give the customer a discount for business cost
they expect to avoid considering future rewards.
Since the customer has defined all types of service incidents in a way that these are
independent of one another, providers will add up all expected penalties (positive) and
rewards (negative) and the net service price to a single monetary value (the gross
service price). As mentioned above, providers are supposed to bid a tuple of service
incident patterns and gross service price.
Therefore, we can use a multi-attribute auction to determine the cost-optimal service offer for the customer. In such a ‘multi-attribute context’ where the customer
reveals the negative impact of service incidents on its business and the providers have
different ‘market expectations’, first-price auctions seem to achieve the best
results [22].
Based on these findings, we define a multi-attribute, first-price, sealed-bid auction
for our setting (see e.g., [21]). In our first-price auction, each provider is asked to
submit one sealed bid, which states a tuple of service incident patterns and service
price it offers. The provider who submits the bid leading to lowest total customer cost
wins the auction and has to be prepared to deliver the service as described in the RfP,
with the promised service incident patterns and at the offered gross service price.
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6.2

Conducting the Procurement Auction

We now briefly describe the procurement auction.
1. Definition of service incident types (customer): For the service in question, the
customer formally describes the different business-relevant types of service incidents including their corresponding sets of attributes. Further, the specific value
range of each attribute is defined.
2. Definition of service incident levels (customer): The customer divides the value
range of each attribute (characterizing a single service incident type) into a set of
disjoint intervals. Therefore, the endpoints of each interval are defined in a way that
attribute values leading to significantly different adverse business impacts are elements of different intervals. Then, the customer calculates the Cartesian product of
the different sets of attribute intervals for each service incident type, i.e., all service
incident levels to be considered are defined.
Example: The service incident type ‘reduced throughput incident’ is characterized
by the two attributes ‘duration of throughput reduction’ (measured in minutes) and
‘degree of throughput reduction’ (measured in percent) with the value ranges (0;c]
and (0;z]. Considering the negative business impact of different attribute value
combinations the customer now divides the range of the duration interval into
three parts – (0;a), [a;b) and [b;c] – and the range of the degree interval into four
parts – (0;w), [w;x), [x;y) and [y;z]. Calculating the Cartesian product of these
two sets of attribute intervals, twelve service incident levels (3 x 4) are defined.
This step is repeated for all types of service incidents of the service in question.
3. Business cost assessment (customer): The customer considers the negative business impacts, which service incidents at the different service incident levels (SIL)
might cause, and assesses these monetarily. Consequently, for each service incident
type the customer specifies a BusinessCost/SIL vector stating the business cost for
each SIL defined in step 2. That is, the (discrete) business cost function regarding
each service incident type is defined.
4. Invitation of providers (customer): The customer invites a number of selected
providers to take part in the procurement auction and sends the RfP including the
business cost functions to these trusted suppliers.
5. Definition of bids (providers): According to the procedure introduced in the previous section, each provider determines the characteristic incident patterns (one pattern for each service incident type) for the SDE it wants to offer. Furthermore, it
calculates the expected penalty and benefit payments it assumes to have to pay / receive. Due to the competitive auction setting the providers will add / subtract these
expected values to / from the net service price. That is, the resulting gross service
price reflects all expected cash flows.
6. Bidding (providers): The providers submit their sealed bids, i.e., tuples of service
incident patterns and service price, to the customer.
7. Winner determination (customer): Among all service offers the customer identifies the bid resulting in the lowest total customer cost. Therefore, the customer multiplies the absolute frequencies for service incidents at certain SILs to occur as stated in the service incident patterns (first part of a provider bid) with its
BusinessCost/SIL vectors (one vector for each service incident type). It adds the re-
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sulting business cost value to the gross service price (second part of a provider bid)
and, thus, determines the total customer cost.
The provider bid winning the procurement auction determines the total customer cost
(fixed value), since the winning provider has to compensate the customer for negative
deviations from the service incident pattern offered but is rewarded for positive deviations as well. If the provider is rewarded, on the customer’s side business cost are
avoided in the same amount. Thus, the winning provider is rewarded if the service in
question is delivered at a higher quality than stated in the service incident patterns,
and is penalized if realized service quality is lower.

7

Conclusion and Outlook

To summarize, we have addressed a service customer’s optimization problem of identifying and selecting a cost-optimal service offer meeting the required level of service
criticality and assuming typically non-linear business impact behavior.
First, we analyzed the information that SLA decisions are typically based upon
and illustrated deficiencies in the service level indicators usually used today. With
regard to our first research question, we showed that the traditional (min, max) indicator regime for measuring service performance is not sufficient to support proper decision making by the customer in case of quantified negative business impact to develop non-linearly with service quality. Furthermore, we discussed how providers’ private information about the behavior of service delivery environments could be leveraged by the customer when selecting service offers.
In order to address our second research question, we developed a procedure enabling customers to solve their optimization problem – given different service offers –
using a procurement auction. Our proposed seven-step auction approach enables providers to calculate business cost measures and, thus, to predict their services’ quantified negative business impact using the customer’s business cost estimates. Thus,
providers can tailor service offers according to customers’ business requirements and
serve their clients’ needs more profoundly. Using the information contained in the
customer’s business cost functions as the basis for penalty and bonus rules, providers
are free to balance resources they use to deliver a service. Moreover, the application
of our procedure enables the customer to compare service offers regarding their expected adverse business impact and, thus, to select the total customer cost-optimal
solution of its optimization problem – in case of linear and non-linear business cost
functions.
Having put forward our approach, we are well aware of a number of limitations
and challenges. First, we assumed providers are able to determine the discrete incident attribute value distributions (e.g., regarding outage lengths) when using specific
service delivery environments. In order to demonstrate this capability, we are currently working on a data mining approach using monitoring data. Second, we assumed the
customer is able to determine its business cost functions for all types of service incidents. We realize that a precise determination of business cost functions may be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, we argue that an economically well-founded investment
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decision about the service offer to purchase has to be made based on information
about business cost. Even a rough estimate of business cost functions might significantly improve a decision with regard to total customer cost. Third, we assumed providers to be risk-neutral. This allows us the simplification of adding expected penalties to and subtracting expected bonus payments from the net service price when defining service offers, i.e., without adding risk premiums. This should be a realistic
assumption at least for large providers supporting numerous, heterogeneous customers as they can spread and diversify their risk. In addition, we assumed that for nonmission-critical, yet non-commodity services, providers will accept a ‘1:1 penalty
rate’ as well as a ‘1:1 bonus rate’. These rates ensure that business cost information
contained in providers’ offers is not distorted when service prices are defined and that
providers have no incentive to state service incident patterns untruthfully. The penalty
rate will be accepted by providers, since they can add all expected penalties to the
service price. In future work we plan to analyze the influence of different provider
risk preferences on the solution of the customer optimization problem. Finally, we
assumed the customer to reveal its business cost functions, which indicate the criticality of the service for its business. The competition among providers, which participate
in the procurement auction, will prevent them from taking advantage of this information and claiming the complete consumer surplus, which results from different
service quality and service price combinations, leading to specific total customer cost.
We are convinced that our approach, enabling customers to compare different service offers and to select the cost-optimal service solution, provides valuable insights
for both, service providers and their customers. It will help both parties to address the
challenge of business and IT alignment in a different way – exploiting analytical insights gained for service delivery environments. At the same time, the limitations
mentioned above leave a broad field for further research.
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